Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 1
Issue 4 Symposium 2005

Article 4

July 2005

Plaintiff's Legal Strategy
William Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp
Part of the Disability Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brown, William (2005) "Plaintiff's Legal Strategy," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 4 ,
Article 4.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss4/4

This Symposium Material is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals
(VOL Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has
been accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information,
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp.

1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 507
Plaintiffs' Legal Strategy
1

William Brown

Thank you, Mr. Stephens, I want to begin by
thanking the Tennessee College of Law and the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy for inviting my client and
friends, George Lane, Beverly Jones, and me to participate
in the symposium on the case. It is also a pleasure to renew
acquaintances with Solicitor General Moore, and Attorney
General Summers, with whom I had the occasion to share a
bit of history with on a cold day in January in Washington,
D.C. I am pleased to see Patty Millett visiting with us in
Tennessee.
I can never say enough about the
encouragement and support she gave me during the course
of preparation for the argument before the Supreme Court
last year. For that I will be eternally grateful. As we
approach the anniversary of Tennessee v. Lane,2 it is
appropriate for us to reflect for a few moments on the
implications of that decision and appreciate the strategies
that were used to develop the issue that was decided.
Perhaps the first thing that we should address is: What was
the issue that was presented?
That simply stated is whether or not Congress
properly abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity against money damage claims by
average citizens when it passed Title II of the ADA. 3 It
sounds like money. Little did I know in 1998 when I filed
the lawsuit that the implications would be considerably
more broad and dramatic. Please understand just how naive
1 Mr. Brown argued Tennessee v. Lane on behalf of the plaintiffs,
George Lane and Beverly Jones, before the United States Supreme
Court. He is a 1974 graduate of the Tennessee Technological
University and received his J.D. from the University of Tennessee
College of Law in 1977.
2 541 U.S. 549 (2004).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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I really was when I filed this lawsuit. I was a small town
lawyer who had primarily had a practice that consisted of
doing deeds, wills, and mundane areas of trial practice.
Most of my constitutional law experience was an
occasional foray into the Fourth Amendment when I had a
client that needed a break from criminal prosecution. I
heard in law school there was a principle of law kept you
from suing the state, but I thought Congress held the trump
card. When George Lane rolled into my office in 1996 and
told me about his experience in Polk County, Tennessee,
where he had to crawl up some steps to get to court because
he could not walk, and then was put in jail because he
refused to crawl or be carried, I thought that there was a
law that said a state could not do that.
I went to the U.S. Code Annotated, and there it was
in black and white. A state cannot discriminate against
people with disabilities who are otherwise qualified in its
programs and services because of that disability, period. In
another section, it said that if a state did, then the person
who had suffered that discrimination had a right to exercise
all remedies including remedies at law and in equity, and
that the state could not claim immunity.
Boy, this case looked like a slam dunk. It was
obvious. I thought I could file suit, make the State and
counties fix the courthouses like they were supposed to,
maybe collect some money for George and Beverly, and
maybe make some money for myself. Little did I know the
road would be a lot longer, and the implications would
involve the viability of Title II of the Americans with
Disability Act, and the ultimate question of what power
Congress really had under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to make states fulfill their fundamental
responsibilities to their citizens under the Constitution.
In August of 1998, I filed suit in federal district
court in Nashville on behalf of George and Beverly against
the State of Tennessee and twenty-five counties claiming
these public entities had discriminated against George,
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Beverly, and all other citizens of the State of Tennessee
with mobility disabilities because they conducted their
judicial program in inaccessible courthouses. I asked the
court to make them fix the program, to pay my clients
money for damages for the discrimination they suffered,
and to pay me some attorney's fees for having to bring the
lawsuit.
My secretary told me that the state attorney
general's office called and said they wanted to talk to me. I
remember thinking to myself, "They want to settle!" I got
on the phone, [and] they asked me if the State could have
[an] extension of time to answer the complaint. I agreed to
the request for an extension and I remember rocking back
in my chair and saying, "Why do they want to embarrass
themselves by having to admit everything?" The facts were
not seriously in dispute, I had pictures of the courthouses
and a ton of twists to what had happened to George and
Beverly, there really was not a material issue of fact for the
plaintiffs. We were not going to settle this month, but
maybe soon.
A couple of weeks later, I received the State's
motion for the case to be dismissed because of its Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, which when I read it
through, I thought was silly. After all, didn't Congress pass
a law saying that a state's sovereign immunity had been
done away when it came to the ADA? Again, I thought
this would be a slam dunk in reading over the state's
memorandum of news, City of Boerne v. Flores.4 This case
had been issued the year before, and the Court had directly
pronounced the meaning of the Constitution, and that
Congress could not overturn the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution. Boerne was the beginning of a steady
stream of cases where the Supreme Court began to restrict
Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment.

4 521

U.S. 507 (1997).
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I filed my response to the State's motion to dismiss
and [waited] for the decision. Several weeks later I received
a copy of a document in the mail from the clerk's office,
and noticed at the bottom of the page in longhand that I
could barely read, Judge Higgins, our federal district judge,
had written "State's motion to dismiss is denied," with his
signature. So much for memorandum opinions.
I understood this to mean that he agreed with me
and there really was not much to the State's motion to
dismiss. A few weeks later I received another pleading
from the State. This time they were appealing the case to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, as well as
asking the court to stay all proceedings pending the appeal.
I knew then the State really did not want to answer my
complaint.
The district court state proceedings resulted in a
stay of all the proceedings against the counties. If we could
not get injunctive relief to fix the courthouses, we were
dead in the water. We were not going to settle the case that
month.
[I] went to Cincinnati to argue the case, and the
federalism storm clouds were getting darker. The State
argued forcefully because Title II involves a class of
individuals that are disabled, under City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,5 only a rational basis [test was
applied] for the state[s] to treat individuals with disability
differently under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As such, the State argued that under Boerne,
Congress had overstepped its authority because it was
preventing states from treating people with disabilities
differently. As long as their conduct was rational, states
were constitutionally permitted to discriminate. This was
terribly wrong, especially with reference to our case. After
all, we were not just talking about any program, we were
talking about the fundamental right of access to the courts.
5473 U.S. 432 (1985).

4

1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 511

It struck me as the ultimate insult to say to disabled
citizens that everyone has a fundamental right of access to
the courts except you, and that only a rational basis test
would be applied to your right to access that program, and
if the sovereign cannot afford to fix that program, well,
tough luck.
When Congress passed the ADA, they made a
specific finding that those with disabilities were a discreet
and insular minority that was powerless to defend its rights.
When we had oral argument in the Sixth Circuit, the panel
hearing the case seemed to be buying into the Congress's
argument. While we were waiting for the court to decide
our case, the Supreme Court delivered its opinions in
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank 6 and Kimel v.
FloridaBoard of Regents. Cases were being delivered by
the Court striking down congressional attempts to take
away state sovereign immunity. None of these, however,
involve the Americans with Disability Act.
Then the Court delivered its opinion in Board of
Trustees v. Garrett.8 This was the first time the court had
dealt with the ADA on the issue of money damages against
the state. The issue presented for the Court allowed the
Court to deal with both Title I and Title II of the ADA.
The Court continued its rightward march. In a vote
of five to four with Kennedy and O'Connor concurring, the
Court struck down congressional action in abrogating a
state's sovereign immunity, but it only resolved Title I
claims associated with employment.
It specifically
deferred Title II and government programs to a different
day.
Needless to say, there were few who supported the
ADA who had much hope for the continued viability of the

6 527 U.S. 627 (1999).

528 U.S. 62 (2000).

8531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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Americans with Disability Act. We did not hear from the
Sixth Circuit for over two years.
In July of 2002, the Circuit Court issued apro curia
opinion affirming the decision over the district court. We
had won again. This was in spite of Garrett and clearly
bucking the collective trend in the Supreme Court and
circuits. For some reason, this conservative circuit court
just could not hold that Congress did not have the power to
keep people from having to crawl or be carried up steps to
get to court.
The State asked the Court to reconsider and the
Court took it under advisement. They thought about it until
January 10, 2003, and again ruled in our favor. We waited
for several months to see what the State was going to do,
and we got their application for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. I realized I was not going to get the case
settled that month either.
We filed our response and waited for the Court to
determine if certiorari would be granted. During that time
there was a tremendous pressure from disability rights
community on the State to drop their appeal. We, likewise,
came under extensive pressure from many in the disability
rights community to not go forward and to withdraw our
claim for monetary damages.
There was a common feeling that this case could
make or break the ADA, and some advocates in the
disability community were not willing to take the risk. My
attitude was that if we cannot win this one, what could we
win? Certiorari was granted, we waited on the State's
brief. When we received it, we went to work on ours. I
was very fortunate to have the able assistance of Sam who
taught constitutional law at Harvard and was an expert on
disability rights. Tom Goldstein, of the firm of Goldstein
& Howe, also assisted us on our brief. We went round and
round about various approaches to take on the brief.
We knew there were two strengths we had. First,
there was the fact [that] it does not sound right to have
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people having to crawl upstairs to get to court to a bunch of
lawyers, especially if the alternative is for the lawyers to
carry them. The second thing was that we had the strong
counter to the Cleburne rational basis standard, the issue of
fundamental rights. The problem we confronted was that
while our case implicated fundamental rights, Title II
implicated everything including, as the State strategically
spoke about, rest stops on the interstate. The breadth of
Title II posed a difficult problem that would be difficult to
cover in a maximum 50 page brief. We ran into the
problem of running out of pages before we could finish the
second prong if we had to cover everything.
Sam Bagentoss suggested the "as applied" analysis,
that is to say that we would ask the Court not to feel
compelled to address all aspects of Title II, but only
consider whether Title II was constitutional as it applied to
the fundamental right of access to the courts. This allowed
us to focus the Court's attention on what was a serious
problem with serious facts concerning a fundamental right.
It also gave us the strategic advantage of keeping the
Court's attention on access to the courts and not access to
rest stops.
Besides, Patty Millett and the Justice
department would have to cover everything else and we
knew they would do a splendid job.
We filed our brief, and I started attending some
moot court sessions, all of which Patty Millett participated
in. The first one I went to was in December of 2004, about
a month before the oral argument. I had a panel of eight
experienced constitutional lawyers, all of whom had argued
numerous times before the Supreme Court to serve as my
moot justices.
It was a grueling experience to say the least. And
[it] lasted for about an hour and a half. Then they got to tell
me what they really thought of my presentation. Now, you
need to understand the moot took six times the length of
time I would have before the Court. I did not have a
chance to catch my breath or collect my thoughts while
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being pounded by a group of lawyers who not only
practiced constitutional law, but also argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court for a living. You can imagine what they
thought of me and it was not good.
It was after that experience that the implications of
Tennessee v. Lane really hit me square in the face. One of
my colleagues sat me down and told me that the future of
55 million Americans with disabilities was riding on my
shoulders. He was not optimistic. I filed a lawsuit to get a
little money for George and Beverly which had evolved
into a question of whether or not 55 million Americans
could be denied their fundamental rights of citizenship. My
shoulders were really sagging under the responsibilities.
This was serious business.
I arrived at the court on the morning of January
13th, 2004, I had worked hard, gone through two or more
moots, [and] listened to fifteen Supreme Court arguments
that were available online. Ours was the first case on the
docket and General Moore opened the argument. Some of
the first questions that were posed to him were by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.
Now, with the five to four split in Garrett,we knew
we had to change one vote-it had to be either Kennedy or
O'Connor, and I was looking to O'Connor. She had a
history of being pragmatic with a common sense approach
to most of her decisions associated with civil rights. My
reading of her was that she wanted people to be treated
properly, with respect and dignity without placing a too
onerous burden on the states. I was also optimistic about
her because she had been a state trial judge that had to deal
with real people in a personal way. I suspected that in
Arizona she had to deal with old, uncomfortable
courthouses, stubborn county commissions, and perhaps
had even seen a few people carried up steps in her life's
experience. She might not buy everything in Title II, but I
felt that she would not be comfortable letting the state get
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by with having people crawl up steps to get to court.
Justice O'Connor's questions were direct and simple.
She asked, "Mr. Moore, does Tennessee provide
any cause of action for the alleged violations here? The
lack of access to the courthouse?" He candidly responded,
"No - there is no private action under our State Public
Buildings Act." 9 She asked him again, "You're satisfied
under Tennessee law there would be no monetary relief
available?" He responded, "I think that is right." She then
asked him a third question: "And would there be any
enforcement actions at all available to compel under
Tennessee law the courthouse to be accessible?"
He
answered, "No, your Honor." The argument went another
fifteen minutes including my fifteen minutes, but after
those three questions I felt confident our strategy had
worked. Sandra Day O'Connor was not about to leave my
clients without a remedy against the denial of their
fundamental rights.
On May 17th, 2004, the court announced the
decision in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens. We
had won by a 5-4 vote with Justice O'Connor in the
majority. Justice Stevens focused on exactly what we had
set out for them, [that] access to the courts is a fundamental
right and there is ample history in the record that Congress
generated that supports the conclusion that the states have
unconstitutionally discriminated against people with
disabilities in the administration of their programs. In
conclusion, the Court need only consider Title II in the
context of access to the court and we will leave to another
day the abrogation of sovereign immunity with reference to
other programs.
Justice O'Connor did not write a word, but her
influence and belief in civil rights is clearly there.
There was hope that the purposes for which Title II
was passed would be a reality. The potential for disaster,
9 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-120-201 to -205 (2005).
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for not only disability rights but all aspects of civil rights, is
starkly contained in the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Scalia. The Chief Justice rejected the "as
applied" inquiry. More significantly, the Chief Justice said
that there was nothing unconstitutional about George Lane
having to crawl up the stairs to get to court, nor was there
anything unconstitutional about his being arrested for
refusing to be carried. In fact, it was perfectly acceptable.
George Lane's
After all, he did get to court.
inconvenience, his words, of having to crawl to his day in
He
court was not in his opinion unconstitutional.
not
commented that, "Jones, a disabled court reporter, does
seriously contend that she suffered a constitutional injury."
I was trying to be as serious as I could get. The principle
that bad conduct by states towards its citizens, even if
illegal and discriminatory, is never unconstitutional almost
became the law of the land.
Justice Scalia's dissent was even more drastic. His
view would, in effect, abolish the ability of Congress to
enact prophylactic [legislation] under the Fourteenth
Amendment in any area except race. In other words,
Congress has no general prospective power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect citizens from the denial
of due process of law or the equal protection of the laws in
any area except race. This conclusion, if held by a majority
of the Court, would have completely emasculated the
It provides protection from
Fourteenth Amendment.
arbitrary acts by states against their citizens. Those citizens
would not be subject to any protection by Congress,
without the Fourteenth Amendment, which extends the
right of private litigants to bring actions to vindicate their
civil rights. It would bring in serious question whether
Congress had the power to pass legislation that gave
authority to the federal executive branch to intervene in
federal courts on behalf of citizens who were being
deprived of fundamental rights on grounds other than race.
The one caveat was that Congress could conduct trials
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directly at specific states and state actors where there had
been an identified history of "relevant constitutional
violations." That, of course, would never happen. What
senator would ever let his state be singled out for a trial by
Congress, let alone allow a finding of relevant
constitutional findings?
In addition, remember that under Boerne, the
Supreme Court decides what is and is not constitutional. If
the principle that bad conduct is not unconstitutional
conduct was the law of the land, there may not have been
any civil rights to protect. This would turn on its head the
concept that the role of Congress is to pass laws that
regulate conduct, not to make findings of fact in order to
punish conduct. The implications of the issue for the Court
in Tennessee v. Lane were broader than money damages
under Title II. The power of Congress to protect citizens
with or without disabilities from the denial of fundamental
rights was eerily at stake. Because of the shift of one vote
by one justice, perhaps the whole concept of civil rights
was saved.
I never dreamed my little case to fix the courthouses
and get George and Beverly a little money would bring our
country back from the brink of the abolition of the power of
Congress to guarantee the civil rights of all of us, even in
areas other than disabilities. Should a person be denied
their rights of citizenship because they are disabled?
Hopefully the answer to that question will never
again be seriously in doubt. The real hope for individuals
with disabilities under Title II is not that they will be able
to collect money from states, it is that they will be treated
like any other citizen and they will not have to sue every
time they want or need to access a state program. With the
decision in Tennessee v. Lane, it is clear that they are
citizens whose fundamental rights under the Constitution
can be protected by congressional action. Hopefully, they
will be expanded to other programs and services as applied
analysis is developed. The best news for George and
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Beverly is the state has adopted procedures that no person
has to crawl up steps to get to a court of law. For me, I
finally got this case settled.
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